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South looking good now the tower cranes are both gone

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From todays construction news;


Exclusive: Mace has been paid nearly £100m by Tottenham Hotspur for its role in the construction of the team’s new stadium so far.

A Spurs spokesman confirmed to Construction News that the contractor had earned the figure in its construction management role.

The club was responding to claims by a project insider, who spoke to CN on the condition of anonymity, that there was a public misconception about the way the project was being managed.

“Tottenham had everyone there that Mace had, all the big roles had their own counterparts. They knew everything,” the source alleged.

“In fact, if it wasn’t for Mace, the job would actually be a hell of a lot worse off. But that’s not the way it was sold.”

The source close to the job alleged to CN that Mace “had their hands tied on that project”.

“There was nothing they could say or do that didn’t make them look like the guilty party, because of the way it was portrayed,” they added.

A report in The Times last November said: “Some at Tottenham fear the builders are deliberately stringing out the project, with Daniel Levy, the chairman, known to have been critical of a number of the contractors involved.”

The Spurs chairman was quoted in October last year as saying: “I wish I was able to confirm an exact opening date and fixture.

Breaking the stadiums myth[/paste:font]
“However, in light of factors completely outside of our control, contractors missing deadlines and possible future unforeseen issues, we are naturally being cautious in respect of our timetable for our test events and official opening game.”

The project insider took issue with the way in which statements on the stadium had described the relationship between Spurs and its contractors.

“It was all ‘Tottenham have been told this’ and ‘Tottenham have been told they haven’t delivered’ so Mace was the scapegoat.”

Responding to the allegations, a Tottenham spokesman said: “We have an in-house project management team, similar to most clients carrying out a development project worth hundreds of millions, which has since expanded to oversee design responsibility.

“Mace is the club’s appointed construction manager and has been paid nearly £100m for this role so far. Mace maintains a strong presence on site and has worked closely with the club to procure the supply chain.”

Spurs also denied the suggestion, made to CN from multiple sources, that Sir Robert McAlpine had withdrawn from the bidding due to the project’s timeframe.

Instead, the club stated that the bid had changed.

“At a very late stage, Sir Robert McAlpine declined to submit the fixed-price design-and-build tender they had prepared and offered to proceed on a construction management basis,” the spokesman said.

Mace was appointed as the stadium’s construction manager back in 2015, fending off interest from Multiplex and Sir Robert McAlpine.

The club revealed other contractors had been reluctant to bid for the fixed-price design-and-build contract, despite it being the form of agreement favoured by the project’s financial backers.

“Other main contractors were also unwilling to bid on the fixed-price design-and-build form of contract preferred by banks – for a stadium – when they had lower risk opportunities in other sectors, such as office developments,” the spokesman said.

At the time the decision was made, a source told CN that despite having been shortlisted for the job, Multiplex withdrew before the contract was awarded.

When the initial shortlist was announced, CN was also informed by sources that despite discussions with Spurs, Bouygues and Laing O’Rourke had decided not to bid for the project.

Responding to the points raised by CN, a spokesman for Mace claimed the majority of the cash paid to the contractor was for cost-reimbursable items.

“The vast majority of money paid to Mace by Tottenham Hotspur are cost-reimbursable items required to fund organisational and logistic requirements, including preliminary works, waste removal, welfare facilities, traffic management and site hoardings.

“We are working collaboratively with the entire Tottenham Hotspur supply chain to deliver what will be one of the world’s greatest stadiums as soon as possible,” the Mace spokesman said.

“Recent inspections have progressed well and we remain in constant dialogue with the club, advising them on progress.”

Earlier this month, Spurs confirmed a further delay to the opening, announcing the team would be playing its February home fixtures at Wembley.

The statement from the club said that Tottenham had received an update from the contractors involved regarding the “critical safety systems”, and that remedial works took place in December.

Sir Robert McAlpine declined to comment.
 
Found the total opposite. His stuff has always been pretty accurate. He can only go by what he is told. Spurs keeping changing their tune which I think is the real problem.

I was told in July by a good friend who represents certain parts of NFL that the stadium would not be ready for at least October and that the first 'game' would be the NFL one. Got roundly abused on here for passing on information. Anyway they were all fuming when Tottenham didn't even make that deadline as they were telling sponsors that the NFL game would be the first competitive game at the stadium. My friend believes Levy just flat out lied to them.

Sadly the term absolutely accurate is not true. Its not necessarily his 'fault' as he is (as I have said) a station worker with TFL so the potential for misunderstanding and mis communication is obvious on a technical subject.

As an example, if you go back on his timeline maybe 4 weeks or so he was (like everyone else) crossing fingers that we would be passing the safety tests within days. And that seemed to be based upon what he was told.

But sadly incorrect as we now know.

Lots of people have said the stadium would not be opening on time (and the same about the stadium never being built), mainly based upon the stadium build not being completed - probably based upon a lack of understanding of the difference between the stadium being 'ready (ie safe enough - just like WHL was in the last season, a building site but safe enough) and the stadium being 'finished;'. Being right for the wrong reasons doesn't prove 'Levy was lying'
 
Looks like the TV screens are going in for the East side video wall

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Was going to post similar. Only worry on the East side is the last bit of framework (just underneath and to the left of the yellow circle) which has been waiting to be fitted for weeks now. There were rumours that the manufacturers were under pressure to bring the order for the east side cladding being brought forward from the summer (original scheduled time) to now - so hope this last bit is being manufactured and will be able to be installed in the next week, otherwise might hold things up.
 
I didn't think they'd put another screen on the East side. I understand putting one facing the high road, but one that faces all the residential roads seems kinda redundant.
Yeah, that's what I thought. It's too far over to be visible from Park Lane when walking form Northumberland Park station too, I'd have thought.

At least those at the school next door will get a good view
 
From todays construction news;


Breaking the stadiums myth[/paste:font]



Not sure anyone else registered to read those two pieces, but have just finished the first one, it was a very interesting read:

Stadium myths shattered: 90s new-builds to the Spurs soap opera

Late, over-budget and fraught with problems… stadium builds certainly have a bad reputation, but is it warranted? CN finds huge strides have been made in the sector over the past 20 years.

The day after Spurs fans invaded the pitch at White Hart Lane to celebrate for the last time at their club’s 118-year-old home, Mace chief executive Mark Reynolds was handed the keys.

It was a symbolic gesture described by club chairman Daniel Levy as an “historic milestone”.

Mace had now taken on “full responsibility” for White Hart Lane as “main contractor”.

On site, however, the reality of the situation was a little different.

Tottenham had been running the project long before they drafted in Mace as the construction manager. Work on the site adjoining the team’s old ground had been well under way before the keys were handed over, led by Tottenham’s in-house project director Paul Phillips.

The Premier League side had also signed deals with several subcontractors prior to the appointment of Mace.

Mr Phillips was supported by an array of experienced in-house managers and the football club had acquired six tower cranes for the project.

Proposals had also been lodged for a separate 330-home mixed-use scheme, which the club planned to build after the stadium project was complete.

Maybe the semantics of it didn’t matter to Mace at the time; the suggestion that it was taking responsibility didn’t have negative connotations.

But by September the following year, that had all changed.

Responsibility had turned to blame with the club facing a backlash from fans amidst a media frenzy.

A stadium scheme source, who spoke to Construction News on the condition of anonymity, claims that there was a major public misconception about the way the project was run.

“Tottenham had everyone there that Mace had; all the big roles had their own counterparts. Every project manager. They knew everything,” the source alleged.

“In fact, if it wasn’t for Mace, the job would actually be a hell of a lot worse off. But that’s not the way it was sold. Mace had its hands tied on that project. There was nothing it could say or do that didn’t make it look like the guilty party, because of the way it was portrayed.”

But is the Spurs experience a familiar tale when it comes to UK stadiums?

Responding to questions about its role on the project, a Spurs spokesman said this was not unusual on a project of this scale and that the in-house project management team it employed had expanded to oversee the design.

The spokesman added that Mace had earned nearly £100m to date and had “worked closely with the club to procure the supply chain”.

CN research has revealed that a history of failure has transformed the way these projects are run, and Spurs will have felt that they had little choice but to take on the risk themselves.

It also shows how the ever-increasing complexity of these projects has caused a twentyfold rise in the price of building a stadium, an increase in the time to complete, as well as frequently ballooning project costs.

Bidding too low

In 1997, Sunderland played the first game at their brand new home, the Stadium of Light.

Construction of the new arena had taken a year, at a cost of around £16m.

It was the first newly built football ground above a 40,000-seat capacity to be built in the wake of the 1991 Taylor Report, which recommended that, following the Hillsborough disaster, all-seater stadiums be a requirement for teams in the top two divisions of English football.

Many other clubs took inspiration from Sunderland’s speedily built and relatively affordable new stadium and began making plans for their own.

The contractor for the project, Ballast Wiltshier, carved out a niche as a stadium specialist working on a number of subsequent schemes in the following years across England’s top leagues, including the £43m expansion of the home of the Wearsiders’ bitter rivals, Newcastle United: St James’ Park.

However, Ballast’s growth in the stadium sector was coupled with a poor performance financially.

Despite winning seemingly high-value projects, it struggled to turn a profit.

Most of the jobs secured by the firm were on fixed-price contracts, where the contractor’s fee was set and could not increase even if the job proved more difficult and costly than budgeted.

These arrangements left no room for manoeuvre if problems arose on the job. And the nature of stadium contracting meant that problems often did.

Several contractors were put off working on Sunderland’s stadium because they believed the price was simply too low, with one even withdrawing having been shortlisted.

Following completion of the Stadium of Light there was also legal battle over an alleged non-payment of £1m between subcontractor Crown House Technologies and Ballast.

Six years after building Sunderland’s home stadium, specialist Ballast went bust with debts of £156m.

Their story was mirrored by Laing Construction, another contractor that carved out a niche building big grounds.

The firm was appointed to build both the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff and the City of Manchester stadium for the Commonwealth Games.

The Millennium Stadium project turned out to be a nightmare for Laing, which had to fork out £31m to cover project costs, having won the deal on a fixed-price arrangement, which it later admitted was bid too low.

The effects of this ‘Cardiff curse’ were a contributing factor in Laing Group’s decision to dispose of its construction arm to O’Rourke for £1 in 2001.

Meanwhile, the so-called ’home of football’, Wembley Stadium, proved to be the biggest example of a fixed-price disaster.

Australian giant Multiplex found itself about £340m in the red, having agreed to rebuild the stadium for £458m.

What’s more, the project was delivered four years later than the FA planned, thereby missing the scheduled curtain raiser: the 2006 FA Cup final.

Escalating costs
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Since Sunderland built the Stadium of Light there have been seven new stadiums of above 40,000 seats constructed in the UK.

Two of these project’s; the City of Manchester Stadium and the London Stadium, were built originally as athletics stadiums and then converted to football grounds.

Analysis by CN of these projects reveals that on a cost per seat basis, with prices adjusted for inflation, there has been a near twentyfold increase (1,946 per cent) in the cost of building these larger stadiums over that 20-year period.

Between the construction of Woolwich’s stadium in 2006 and Spurs this year the cost to build a new ground has more risen by 53.4 per cent.

The rise in project costs between the figures initially announced and the final sums has been consistently high.

The difference between the figure announced by the team and the eventual price is on average more than double (113.87 per cent).

Shift in the power dynamic

A lack of appetite from contractors to take on the risks associated with the Spurs stadium was a key factor in the club’s decision to take the project management of the stadium in-house.

The cautionary past tales of Ballast, Laing and Multiplex, combined with the overall market conditions, made it difficult to recruit construction firms with the size and ability to deliver the job.

“The risk profile now for complex jobs is huge” says Arcadis Stadia partner Paul Mitchell, who has worked as one of the top consultants on the Emirates Stadium, London Stadium and Spurs Stadium projects.

“With Emirates, we were on our way out of a recession, but [contractors] were still fairly hungry for work.

“The contractors were in reasonable shape and it was a simpler project.”

Woolwich’s was the last major UK stadium project to be procured using a fixed-price contract back in 2004; Sir Robert McAlpine built the 60,000 arena over a three-year period.

“When we got to Spurs, contractors had lots of work; [they had also] had a really hard time and were suffering,” Mr Mitchell says.

“A lot of them had introduced new governance around what they could bid, how they would bid things and how they would contract projects.”

With the contractors wary or unable to take on significant risk, negotiations for the Spurs followed a different route to how they had done in the past.

“We were in a place where we had to be out trying to sell our projects to contractors, rather than [like] in the old days when we would let them bid,” Mr Mitchell tells CN.

“They were dictating to us, the clients, whose projects they would pitch for, how they would even contract those projects.

“We were bringing them in on a fairly regular basis, showing them where we were in the design process and effectively warming them up for bidding for the project.”

Arcadis’ leading stadium consultant told CN that this form of negotiation – with the builders dictating terms – continued down into some of the subcontractor agreements.

The limited pool of contractors capable of managing a scheme of this scale is another factor in determining the power dynamic between club and builder.

“The nature of a stadium is that there is only a limited pool of contractors nationally that can do it”, says Rider Levett Bucknall’s global board member and stadium specialist, Russell Lloyd, who is advising Everton on their proposed new stadium.

“Stadiums haven’t got a great track record for contractors in terms of their risk profile, and it’s no different for this one [Everton], and the Tottenham scenario hasn’t helped.”

The big delay myth

Despite the popular narrative that stadium projects are always delayed, evidence shows that the majority of the big grounds are delivered on time, especially once the construction timetable is established.

Of the seven larger stadiums built since 1991 only two have missed their sporting deadlines because of construction delays; Spurs and Wembley

Woolwich’s plans to build their new home were delayed and the project was mothballed for a spell.

But this was due to the scheme’s financial backers getting cold feet rather than issues with the construction.

The club moved in for the 2006-07 season as planned, once the financial issues were resolved.

“Stadiums haven’t got a great track record for contractors in terms of their risk profile, and it’s no different for [Everton], and the Tottenham scenario hasn’t helped”

Russell Lloyd, RLB

The perception that stadium mega-projects are regularly delayed in the UK is probably driven by the disastrous Wembley redevelopment.

Wembley was closed in 2000 and did not reopen for seven years, due to a host of planning and financial difficulties.

But the construction delay was in fact one of the shorter setbacks, only adding a year to the project.

However, with the site having been closed for so long, that final additional delay in 2006 undoubtedly intensified the public disappointment.

“Wembley was an unmitigated disaster, but with the other stadiums, most people that know them would say they’re pretty successful projects,” says Imtech chief executive Paul Kavanagh, whose firm has worked as the electrical contractor on most of the major stadium projects, including the Emirates, the Olympic stadium/conversion and Spurs.

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Of the seven large stadiums built since 1991, three of those delivered on time were completed in order to host global sporting events.

The Millennium Stadium was the centrepiece for the 1999 Rugby World Cup; the City of Manchester Stadium had to be completed in time for the 2002 Commonwealth Games; and the London Stadium opened for the 2012 Olympics.

Event-driven deadlines, Mr Kavanagh explains, offer no room for delay.

“You start off with a very firm end date,” he says.

“The Olympics is the classic example: it didn’t matter what happened between then and the Olympics, it was going to happen on 27 July 2012.”

Event-driven projects also benefit from advantages in terms of funding, planning and land acquisition, obstacles that often delay the start of a stadium project.

This is because the stakeholders in the joint venture behind the stadium always include a public body.

The local authority is not only in charge of planning at the stadium’s location, they can rely on central government to bail it out should the project run into financial obstacles.

This is critical for stadium projects above 40,000 seats in capacity, despite a popular belief about the seemingly unending wealth of large football clubs, as RLB’s Mr Lloyd tells CN.

“There’s a perception that English Premier League football is a rich man’s game because of the amount of money involved.

“But actually, big money goes in, big money goes out; the clubs are run on quite tight margins.

“And any big development usually involves going to market to borrow money.”

It’s also worth considering, that the only reason Spurs’ stadium is late is because the timeframe set by the club was shorter than any stadium deadline in the past 20 years.

If you adjust for that, then the only project of the seven that overran was Wembley.

“It did frighten a lot of the main contractors”

Since the turn of the century the minimum length of time taken to build these big stadiums has stood at three years.

In fact, no stadium of above 40,000-seat capacity has been built from scratch in less than that timeframe since the Millennium Stadium was finished in 1999.

Tottenham’s leaders were determined to buck that trend and set themselves a two-year period to complete the job.

“The timeframe was a challenge,” Arcadis’ Mr Mitchell says. “We always knew it was a challenge and it was one the club wanted us to embrace.”

He says the deadline had an impact on the appointment of a contractor and the type of contract used.

“It did frighten a lot of the main contractors. They were up for the challenge, but the probably wouldn’t have signed up for a lump sum design and build contract on that basis.”

According to Spurs, Sir Robert McAlpine declined to submit the fixed-price design-and-build tender it had prepared, and instead offered to proceed on a construction-management basis.

“Other main contractors were also unwilling to bid on the fixed-price design and build form of contract preferred by banks – for a stadium – when they had lower risk opportunities in other sectors, such as office developments,” the spokesman added.

At the time of the Spurs stadium contract award a source told CN, that despite being shortlisted for the job, Brookfield Multiplex had withdrawn before the decision was made.

When the initial shortlist was announced CN was also informed by sources that despite discussions with Tottenham, Bouygues and Laing O’Rourke had decided against bidding for the project.

It appears that, to some extent at least, the industry had learnt its lessons regarding risk, and when Tottenham proposed such an ambitious timescale, contractors appeared to have acted with greater prudence than had been the case in the past.

“We didn’t make enough three years ago of what a monster challenge we were taking on, trying to build the rest of that project in one year,” says Mr Mitchell says.

“I’m sure it will be forgotten.

“People don’t talk about Wembley and the problems they had getting that over the line very often, people don’t talk about Cardiff and the problems they had. Yes, they completed it on time at Cardiff but there were still a lot of issues there.”

Why so slow and expensive?

Whilst it might be a misconception that big stadium projects are frequently late, it is undeniable that they are always expensive.

There has been a twentyfold increase in the cost per seat since the Stadium of Light was built and even adjusting for inflation the total cost to build has gone up considerably.

Those cost increases have come alongside any improvement in the speed at which these projects have been delivered and the reason provided by most of those involved in these projects is the same: complexity.

Perhaps more than any other sector, the expectations of what a stadium could and should look like moves at an incredible pace.

Mr Mitchell witnessed first-hand just how much things changed from the Emirates project to Spurs’ stadium

“The expectations of clients, the public, have all changed considerably and buildings are getting more and more complex,” he says.

“The quality of what we’re providing at Tottenham is just leagues above what we provided initially at Emirates, all of which takes time and costs a lot more money.”

More and more football clubs are attempting to monetise their stadiums when they are not using them.

But creating bespoke multi-purpose spaces can be expensive. Spurs’ new stadium, for example, features the world’s first three-piece movable football pitch with an American Football surface beneath it for hosting NFL games.

The concourses are pillarless so they can be used to host conferences.

Decisions around such features are often made on a timescale unrelated to the construction programme, which means plans can end up changing on site.

Hospitality areas must feature the most up-to-date facilities, which often requires decisions to be delayed to the latest possible stage or altered as the job progresses, says Imtech’s Paul Kavanagh.

“Every time that we do one [stadium project], they get more complex”, he says. “[In particular] the management of hospitality, because the quality of the experience just goes up and up, and then the sophisticated systems managing that goes through step changes, all the time.

“Change is going to happen through those jobs because of the pressures from [clients]. You have to respond quickly and add value.”

His thoughts are echoed by Mr Lloyd. “Stadiums are bespoke and trying to get that right first time is challenging,” he says. “Change can often come [unexpectedly] during construction, and if that happens, it’s costly.”

Vulnerable to shocks

The scale of a stadium project also makes it more vulnerable to being impacted by unexpected events.

The sheer volume of materials bought in from overseas meant the devaluation of the pound in the wake of Brexit had a greater impact on Spurs stadium than other smaller projects.

Likewise, the lack of skilled labourers and abundance of work in London hit Tottenham harder because of the huge number of workers required for the job.

Although, Imtech CEO Paul Kavanagh doesn’t believe that there is essentially much difference between challenges faced on a stadium project and other schemes of a similar scale.

“I’m not sure I see a huge difference between building a stadium and building a huge mixed-use high-end high-value project somewhere in central London”, he says

“What happens with the costs or the programme will depend on how long you’ve had at the front to make the decisions, whether you’ve got the right procurement method, whether collaboration is right or wrong and then possibly external shocks; those things are common to all projects.”

Another reason costs leap so much from one stadium to another is due to the relative infrequency that they are built.

“We’re working with Everton and they asked for benchmarking projects of that sort of size [above 40,000]”, continues Mr Lloyd.

“Well the last one that was new build of that ilk was Emirates 2006, until Spurs gets built. It’s then they realise the level of inaccuracy that there can be in benchmarking stadiums.”

With Chelsea shelving plans to build a new ground, all eyes will be on Everton at it seeks to start construction of a new ground with more than 50,000 seats to get a sense of the direction the market will go next.

But for those who’ve made their career in this complex and often chaotic sector, one thing is certain, it will be an intense experience.

“They’re a white knuckle ride,” Mr Mitchell tells CN.

“Not just from the construction side, from the beginning, getting your planning permission to acquiring land to the securing your contractor, delivering the brief the client wants, incorporating change, meeting the programmes.

“There are ups and downs all the way through and only the bravest come out the other end.”

Success in scale
It’s important to note that while high-capacity stadiums can have spiralling costs and be hit by delays, smaller-scale schemes in regional locations have often been delivered on time and on budget.

One contractor that has successfully delivered a number of these schemes is Buckingham Group. The firm counts Stadium MK in Milton Keynes and the Amex in Brighton on its CV of high-performing projects.

The firm also has high-capacity project experience having landed the roofing contract for the new Spurs stadium.

So what’s the secret to these smaller projects success compared to the big schemes, other than the obvious factor of scale?

According to Buckingham Group owner Kevin Underwood the main answer is just that.

“Principally it’s the size and the number of people involved.

“The complexity of those developments just makes them a lot more onerous and a lot riskier in terms of achieving deadlines.”

The Buckingham Group boss says the multiple layers of input from different companies on the project can be as big of a factor as the size of the scheme itself.

“There’s a lot more people involved, a lot more interfaces, a lot more stakeholders and with that invariably comes a lot more difficulties and problems.

“You look at some of the bigger projects; they’re normally on very tight sites, which in itself creates problems.”
 
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Did like this but:

“The expectations of clients, the public, have all changed considerably and buildings are getting more and more complex,” he says.

“The quality of what we’re providing at Tottenham is just leagues above what we provided initially at Emirates, all of which takes time and costs a lot more money.”

 
3139961_stadiums_cost-to-build-per-seat.jpg


OK so when people say about our lack of spending yet the club needs to cover £13,500 - £14,000 per seat until the cost is cleared can people please see sense that we need to be more shrewd with our money than ever for the best interests and safety of the club?

West Ham get a stadium that's cost more without having to pay for it, we simply don't have that luxury even if our stadium will be far more superior. At the moment it's simply about keeping pace with the big boys it's the be all and end up with the occasional cup run thrown in as a bonus. First things first, let's do what we can to stay with the pack without having the money to gain an advantage, it is how it is
 
3139961_stadiums_cost-to-build-per-seat.jpg


OK so when people say about our lack of spending yet the club needs to cover £13,500 - £14,000 per seat until the cost is cleared can people please see sense that we need to be more shrewd with our money than ever for the best interests and safety of the club?

West Ham get a stadium that's cost more without having to pay for it, we simply don't have that luxury even if our stadium will be far more superior. At the moment it's simply about keeping pace with the big boys it's the be all and end up with the occasional cup run thrown in as a bonus. First things first, let's do what we can to stay with the pack without having the money to gain an advantage, it is how it is



Cost per seat isn't really relevant - it's cost / income per seat
 
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